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1.   Introduction
i    
The Moniac was the formal start to a quarter-century-long stabilization project that occupied Alban 
William Housego ‘Bill’ Phillips until close to the end of his life. Informally, that research project 
had its gestation in the macroeconomic malfunctions of the Great Depression and the savagery of 
the Second World War.  
That his final essay (2000 [1972], chapter 52) - a handwritten exposition of a version of what 
became known as the Lucas Critique – was unread for almost a quarter century is surely a reflection 
of the discredit and neglect that Phillips and his stabilization project fell into during the Great 
Recriminations that accompanied the Great Inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s.
ii Indeed, Phillips 
(and, subsequently, his widow) kept the sheets of paper on which he made the calculations which 
led to his famous Curve (together with other significant material) – but apparently, nobody thought 
to ask if such material existed. 
Unsuccessful policies often lead to the hunt for ‘Guilty Men’. Politically, the failure of 
Appeasement in the 1930s produced such a hunt; in the process, those who opposed the prevailing 
orthodoxy were sanctified.  Ironically, the Cassandras of Appeasement (Winston Churchill and 
Anthony Eden) in turn became the ‘Guilty Men’ of the early Cold War - responsible for the Victims 
of Yalta (Tolstoy 1986, 25, 26). 
In terms of Economics, Phillips’ reputation suffered because of his eponymous association with the 
Curve that broke down: stagflation was supposedly the result of undue faith in the trade-off 
interpretation of his stabilisation project.  In this highly-charged atmosphere, one cold warrior, 
Richard Deacon (1979, ix), even asserted that “Bill Phillips” and Arthur Cecil Pigou were 
Bolshevik agents plotting to overthrow capitalism: “the extreme forces which precipitate 
hyperinflation and encourage low production ... are mainly allies of the USSR.”  According to 
Deacon (1979, 7, 11, 64, 81, 184-195), in 1939 Pigou set up in Cambridge a Soviet transmission 
centre (together with “Bill Phillips”, an underground communist, codename “Jack”).
iii 
Ordinarily, such accusations would not even be worthy of mention in the scholarly literature.  In 
this instance, however, Deacon’s accusations were picked up and highlighted by the winner of the 
1974 Nobel Prize for Economic Science, Friedrich Hayek (1994, 121) – who was in Cambridge 
during the War - and his Austrian School disciple, Mark Skousen (2001, 334-335; 2009, 338-9).            
It is instructive to compare the supposedly Keynesian inflation-tolerating Phillips Curve trade-off 
with what Phillips and John Maynard Keynes actually wrote on the subject (Leeson 1997; 1999). 
More importantly, however - and more in-keeping with the Phillipsian project - is to extract wisdom 
from Phillips’ mid-twentieth century stabilisation exercise and apply it to the new realities of the 
twenty-first century. That is the primary objective of this paper. 
Section 2 will define the problem to be faced: the current tendency towards permanent financial 
crises. In the immediate post-war period, the problem was perceived to be that of the potentially 
large but ‘natural’ swings of the business cycle – a vastly different problem from the artificially 
created problems posed by financial engineers.  Section 2.1 will provide a brief history of the 
relentless crises generated of the United States financial sector. One crisis is highlighted - the “Bank 
War of 1832-36” – because it is an early illustration of the dangers of discretionary financial 
management. Section 2.2 examines the crises of the post-1973 era and suggests that we may have 
entered The Era of Permanent Financial Crises. Section 2.3 briefly examines the contributions that 
financial engineers have made to this Permanent Threat. 
Section 3 examines – and disposes of - an imaginary weakness in Phillips’ stabilisation project: his 
supposed neglect of inflationary expectations. Section 4 outlines a genuine weakness: the absence in  
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Phillips’ model of a dysfunctional financial sector. An attempt is made to bring the Moniac into the 
twenty-first century by explicitly modelling such dysfunction.                     
Section 5 compares and contrasts the monetary control of the business cycle offered by the Moniac 
with the fiscal alternative.  Section 6 attempts to build a Modern Moniac – with functional 
intermediation. Phillips’ insights are combined with the Consumed Income Tax Structure (CITS) 
literature outlined by Irving Fisher, Nicholas Kaldor and James Meade (6.1); the optimal savings 
literature associated with Pigou and Franco Modigliani (6.2); the public sector balance literature, 
associated with Milton Friedman (6.3); and the rules-based literature, associated with Henry Simons 
(6.4).    
Section 7 examines the implication for stabilisation policy: comparing the benefits of the fiscal 
control of inflation with the vicious consequences of “monetary discipline.” Section 8 examines the 
implications for debt elimination: comparing the savage notions of “fiscal discipline” with the 
alternative of using the price mechanism. The concluding section (9) proposes the establishment of 
a Phillips Club to further examine these proposals.  
2. The Era of Permanent Financial Crises? 
2.1 The Arterial Dysfunction at the Heart of Capitalism   
The U.S. financial sector has generated crises at regular intervals; some of these crises have been 
policy-induced or policy-exacerbated (Meltzer 2003; 2009). This inherent dysfunction will not be 
repaired without fundamental re-engineering. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that 
discretionary policy will be any more successful in dealing with crises than in the past.  This section 
will provide a brief review of some of these past crises and focus on one particular crisis, the “Bank 
War of 1832-36”.    
The first central bank, the First Bank of the United States, was established in 1791, shortly after 
independence; yet, its establishment was followed by crises in 1792-3 and 1796-7. The closing of 
First Bank of the United States was rapidly followed by the War of 1812, war debt, fiscal crisis and 
inflation. The Second Bank of the United States was chartered in 1816 in order to assist the process 
of government financing: however, the Panic of 1819 followed.  
In the 1832 Presidential election, the existence of the Second Bank became an intense party political 
issue. The Bank attempted to defend itself through recession-targeting! The Bank’s president, 
Nicholas Biddle, applied for the Bank's re-charter four years before the charter was due to expire. 
This initiated the “Bank War” of 1832–36 in which two defining American fears (those relating to 
government and the moneyed interest) collided.  
President Andrew Jackson saw a re-charter as a prelude to a coup: he believed that those pressing 
for a re-charter “calculate with certainty to put [Henry] Clay or [John C.] Calhoun in the Presidency 
– and I have no hesitancy to say, if they can recharter the bank, with this hydra of corruption they 
will rule the nation and its charter will be perpetual, and its corrupting influence destroy the liberty 
of our country.”  In January 1934, Calhoun concluded that “the administration will be overthrown. 
It has already received its death blow” (cited by Catteral 1902, 287, 333).  
Biddle saw the Presidential veto as a “manifesto of anarchy, such as Marat or Robespierre might 
have issued to the mob.” Jackson saw his veto as the battle of “democracy against privilege” (cited 
by Catteral 1902, 241, 240). In early 1833, Jackson decided to withdraw government's funds from 
the Bank. The subsequent fiasco resembled the constitutional crisis associated with President 
Richard Nixon’s 1973 Saturday Night Massacre. Two ‘non-compliant’ Treasury Secretaries refused  
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to withdraw the funds until a third complied.  The funds were transferred to seven state-chartered 
banks in late September 1833: the Second Bank had lost its biggest depositor.  
In an attempt to ensure a second term, President Nixon attempted to force the chairman of 
America’s third central bank, Arthur Burns, to create a pre-election boom (or at least to avoid a 
downturn).
iv  In 1834, Biddle attempted to force President Jackson to accept a re-charter by 
engineering a Bank-induced recession. Biddle insisted that existing loans were repaid and new loans 
were not made, thus contracting the money supply. Biddle justified this Bank-induced recession: 
“the ties of party allegiance can only be broken by the actual conviction, of existing distress in the 
community. Nothing but the evidence of suffering abroad will produce any effect in Congress … all 
other Banks and all the merchants may break, but the Bank of the United States shall not break.” 
Jackson retorted that “the government will not bow to the monster … I would rather undergo the 
tortures of ten Spanish Inquisitions than that the deposits be restored or the monster be recharted” 
(cited by Catteral 1902, 330-331, 351-352).  
Biddle suspected that the government was orchestrating panic runs on the Bank. In January 1834, 
the administration attempted to remove from the Bank its function of paying pensions to old 
Revolutionary War veterans. Biddle refused to surrender the pension funds: allowing the Jackson 
Democrats to assert that the Bank would “not spare the holy remnant of the officers and sires of the 
revolution … So sweeping and unsparing are they determine to make the distress, that even a 
solitary soldier of the revolution cannot escape” (cited by Catteral 1902, 299, 307).  
Biddle succeeded in creating a brief recession in the first half of 1834. In 1935, the Bank resumed 
aggressive lending - and contributing to a speculative land bubble. After its national charter expired 
in April, 1836, it continued to operate as a state-chartered bank. Its banking practices partially 
caused the Panic of 1837.  In 1839, Biddle resigned as Bank President, and in 1841, the Bank 
finally failed. Biddle was arrested and charged with fraud (he was later acquitted).  
Further crises followed: in 1857, 1873, 1884 and 1907.  The Panic of 1907 led to the creation of the 
Federal Reserve System.  But as Allan Meltzer (2003; 2009), the historian of the Federal Reserve, 
had documented, this third central bank has also often contributed to crises.   
2.2 Post-1973: Permanent Crises?   
The volume of funds slopping around the world’s financial centres has increased enormously since 
the OPEC oil price rises of 1974. Since then, the intensity and frequency of crises appears to have 
increased.  Some have been locally based: the UK secondary banking crisis 1973-5; the U.S. 
Savings and Loans crisis, 1989-91; the Japanese asset price collapse, 1990; the Scandinavian 
banking crisis, early 1990s; and the speculative assaults on the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, 1992-3. Others have had much larger international ramifications: the Latin American 
debt crisis, 1982; the stock market collapse, 1987; crises in Mexico, 1994, Asia, 1997 and Russia, 
1998.  
It is now clear that the Great Moderation (1982-2007) was built on financially-engineered feet of 
clay. The onset of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis was immediately followed the Great Policy 
Panic (2008-).  Deficit-financed cash was thrown in the direction of the crisis and will most likely 
be followed by panic-induced cuts in government expenditure as fiscal budgets deteriorate.  These 
savage fiscal pendulum swings will destabilise many governments and in some countries may 
undermine the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy.  
We may have entered the Era of Permanent Financial Crises, interrupted by episodes in which it 
may appear that All is Quiet on the Western Banking Front. Those entrusted with the task of  
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regulating the regulation-avoidance industry may sit, like King Canute, demonstrating the futility of 
their project.      
The original Phillipsian stabilization project sought to reduce the swings of the business cycle and 
to alert policy makers to the unintended consequences of some plausible-looking policy proposals. 
In 2008, panicked policy makers leaped into debt traps, presumably aware of at least some of the 
likely consequences. This paper will argue that Phillips’ stabilization agenda, and the Moniac in 
particular, when augmented by wisdom from other mainstream macroeconomic frameworks can 
provide a permanent solution to the problem of financial crises – or at least can provide 
macroeconomic protection from these crises. 
2.3 The Curse of Destabilising Financial Engineering 
 
The distinguished historian H.A.L. Fisher (1971 [1935], v) reflected that “One intellectual 
excitement has … been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discovered in history a 
plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one 
emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave …” In terms of financial crises, 
successive waves of macroeconomic externalities are the inevitable consequence of a mal-
engineered system.   
 
Alan Greenspan (2009) appeared to shift at least part of the blame for the Global Financial Crisis 
onto the academic community: “The extraordinary risk-management discipline that developed out 
of the University of Chicago’s Harry Markowitz in the 1950s produced insights that won several 
Nobel prizes in economics. It was widely embraced not only by academics but also by a large 
majority of financial professionals and global regulators.”   
 
Ironically, in his Nobel Lecture, Markowitz (1990, 286) recalled that in 1955 when he defended his 
“dissertation as a student in the Economics Department of the University of Chicago, Professor 
Milton Friedman argued that portfolio theory was not Economics, and that they could not award me 
a Ph.D. degree in Economics for a dissertation which was not in Economics.”. Later Markowitz 
(2004) recalled: “He kept repeating that for the next hour and a half.  My palms began to sweat”. 
 
Friedman’s demarcation attempt failed.  Markowitz (1990, 286) reflected: “As to the merits of 
[Friedman’s] arguments, at this point I am quite willing to concede: at the time I defended my 
dissertation, portfolio theory was not part of Economics. But now it is”. 
Some risk management gurus appear to be rather nonchalent about their system.  When asked if 
there were “any weaknesses in the current economic structure to bring about a catastrophe like we 
saw in 1929?” Markowitz (2004) replied: “You know, we just don’t know”.   
Others were in a celebratory mood. Greenspan received glowing praise from Alan Blinder and 
Ricardo Reis (2005, 7, 5, 83, 82, 27, 11, 12, 70-71) for his handling of the the dot-com bubble: his 
“mop up after” strategy following the bursting of “the biggest bubble in history” produced a “tiny” 
recession and “not a single sizeable bank failure.  In fact, and even more amazingly, not a single 
stock brokerage or investment bank failed either … If the mopping up strategy worked this well 
after the mega-bubble burst in 2000, shouldn’t we assume that it will work well after other, 
presumably smaller bubbles burst in the future?  Our suggested answer is apparent”. Greenspan, 
they concluded, was “awesome”.  
Greenspan subsequently asserted that “No sensible policy … could have prevented the housing 
bubble” (cited by Ip 2008).  However,  before the Global Financial Crisis some economists were 
warning about the consequencies of the “speculative bubble” in the US housing market: “when the  
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mania ends and the enormous financial bubble bursts, there will be a synchronized downturn in 
many affected countries ... financial and economic meltdowns” (Leeson 2005). Moreover, policies 
were offered which would prevent future bubbles.    
In other disciplines (bridge building, aeronautics etc) engineering advances have reduced risk and 
contributed to better outcomes. After the Great Depression, Philips used engineering tools to help 
stabilize the business cycle. But subsequently, financial engineers have colonised economics and 
have misdirected our professional energies. Financial engineering provides negligible social 
benefits but instead contributes to macroeconomic destabilization. This curse on macroeconomic 
outcomes must be eliminated by financial re-engineering: the Moniac provides a framework in 
which to organise such a project.     
3. An Imaginary Weakness: Inflationary Expectations    
Phillips (2000 [1954], 73) discussed extensions of the Moniac: “This simple model could be 
developed further, in particular by … linking the demand curve for liquid stocks to the rate of 
change of price through a co-efficient of expectations … [which] would result in an oscillating 
system”.  
Milton Friedman admired Phillips’ stabilization model and twice tried to recruit him to the 
University of Chicago. In May 1952, Friedman visited the London School of Economics and 
mentioned to Phillips that a student, Phillip Cagan, was having trouble modelling adaptive 
inflationary expectations. Phillips wrote the adaptive inflationary expectations formula on the back 
of an envelope and handed it to Friedman who gave it to Cagan (2000).  Later, in his American 
Economic Association Presidential Address, Friedman (1968) used adaptive inflationary 
expectations to demonstrate that the Keynesian Phillips Curve had a fundamental flaw: the neglect 
of inflationary expectations.  
In his 1953 Ph.D and again later, Phillips (2000 [1954], fig 16.11, 152) derived a theoretical Phillips 
Curve. His concern was to reduce “the difference between the actual production and the desired 
production … the error in production.” He discussed proportional, integral and derivate stabilisation 
proposals.  
Phillips (2000 [1954], 153) also noted that “Demand is also likely to be influenced by the rate at 
which prices are changing, or have been changing in the recent past, as distinct from the amount by 
which they have changed, this influence being greater, the greater the rate of change of prices ... 
The direction of the change in demand will depend on expectations about future price changes. If 
changing prices induce expectations of further changes in the same direction, as will probably be 
the case after fairly rapid and prolonged movements, demand will change in the same direction as 
the changing prices … positive feedback, tending to intensify the error, the response of demand to 
changing prices thus acting as a perverse or destabilising mechanism of the proportional type. If, on 
the other hand, there is confidence that any movement of prices away from level in the recent past 
will soon be reversed, demand is likely to change in the opposite direction to the changing prices … 
the response of demand to changing prices will act as a normal proportional regulating mechanism.”  
Phillips (2000 [1954], 155, 156) discussed these perverse reactions when “price flexibility is 
increased beyond a certain point. When price expectations operate in this way, therefore, the system 
has fairly satisfactory self-regulating properties when prices are moderately flexible; but becomes 
unstable when there is a high degree of price flexibility … We may conclude that the self-regulating 
properties of the system will be considerably improved if there is confidence that any movement 
away from the level ruling in the recent past will soon be reversed, and that if such confidence is  
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sufficiently great the self-regulating properties will also be better, the higher the degree of price 
flexibility in the system.”  
Indeed, in Friedman’s (1968) model, inflationary expectations are stabilising – the system returns to 
the “natural” rate of unemployment and output.  Inflationary expectations have much more severe 
consequences in Phillips’ model: the system becomes “unstable.”   
4. A Modern Moniac with a Dysfunctional Financial Sector 
In describing the Moniac, Phillips (2000 [1950], 74-75) stated that “Savings flow into the tank 
containing idle or surplus balances, M2 … Investment expenditure … is drawn from M2 … when 
the system is in equilibrium I = S”.  Although Phillips does not explicitly address this issue, the 
money supply can contract from M2 into “the small box on the extreme right of the model.” Thus 
the channelling (hoarding) of savings by intermediaries into vault cash and reserves (thus reducing 
the money supply) could be examined by the Moniac.  
However, it is no longer appropriate to model the financial sector as a black box – a neutral 
transmitter of savings into investment.  A Moniac that seeks to clarify policy thinking must 
represent the financial sector as a value consuming agent.  The financial sector’s share of U.S. 
aggregate income has risen from 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product in 1947 to almost 8% of GDP in 
2006 (Phillipon 2008); in 2006, almost 3 million people were employed in “credit intermediation 
and related activities” out of a total U.S. employment figure of just over 150 million (U.S. National 
Employment Matrix).   
 
To adequately model current finacial arrangements we must therefore introduce a “financial sector 
value consumption box” into Figure 10.3 of the Moniac (2000 [1950], 84).  The financial sector 
also imposes bail-out costs: a “bail out” channel must therefore be forged from the Government 
sector into M2.  
 
Some of the flows into M2 flow out into investment. Other flows become toxic AAA rated lemon-
backed securities - which then circulate until the entire system freezes (as happened in 2008). Thus 
another box – representing the injection of macroeconomic ‘cholera’ - needs to be introduced into 
Figure 10.3 to capture this financial sector externality.
v 
  
The Moniac must also allow some of the outflows from M2 to enter a positive feedback loop (into 
an asset price bubble box) which then self-destructs with adverse consequences for all other flows. 
The “bail-out” flow must then be augmented by an enlarged debt service burden (interest rate) flow 
as one component of the financial sector (vigilante bond dealers) punish governments for 
attempting to deal with the externalities imposed on the system by the financial sector.  In this way, 
the Moniac can address our current dysfunctional arrangements.  
5. Fiscal or Monetary Stabilization?     
Phillips (2000 [1950], 82) referred to the “equilibrating influence of the rate of interest;” he later 
concluded that “It is quite likely, therefore, that a monetary policy based on the principles of 
automatic regulating systems would be adequate to deal with all but the more severe disturbances to 
the system” (2000 [1954], 157).  
Phillips (2000 [1954], 167, n16) also referred to Meade’s fiscal fine-tuning proposal. Meade was 
more responsible than anyone else for Phillips’ first academic appointment. Referring to the “large 
and rich team” of economists at the LSE, Meade (1988, 3) wrote in his autobiographical chapter of 
his Collected Papers: “Of these I will mention only Professor A. W. H. Phillips to whom I owe an 
immense intellectual debt of gratitude for education in the treatment of dynamic systems.”   
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Meade (1978) proposed that the income taxes should be replaced by a progressive Consumed 
Income Tax Structure (CITS) so as to increase household savings and establish a more equitable 
and ethically sound basis for taxation.  CITS can be added to the Moniac to assist the 
macroeconomic stabilization project.    
Monetary theory and policy was allocated a central place in classical thought for obvious reasons: 
the existence of gold standard (with the exception of the Napoleonic War years and its aftermath, 
1797-1819). There were disputes over trade policy (protection versus free trade) but for obvious 
reasons, no parallel dispute over the relative use of fiscal and monetary policy.   
In the twentieth century, monetary policy was the natural first choice for stabilization objectives: 
many exchange rates were fixed prior to 1973 (the creation of a single currency in Europe also 
requires active, but often counter-productive, monetary interventions).  
However, during the twentieth century, the tools of fiscal policy (government spending and 
taxation) increased as a proportion of national income, whilst simultaneously some components of 
the money supply – especially notes and coins – have reduced as vehicles for facilitating exchange. 
Unfortunately existing tax systems (like existing financial system) have not been “designed” in 
accordance with socially optimal principles.  Tax breaks, for example, to facilitate social stability 
through the construction of a “property owning democracy” can distort entrepreneurial incentives, 
exacerbate bubbles and thus undermine economic stability.   
The quest for government revenue has an adhoc character.  The U.S. government was initially 
highly dependent on revenue from tariffs; but after the Second World War, tariffs reduced in 
significance both as a source of government revenue and as a social engineering vehicle.
vi Thus “the 
income earner” replaced “the foreigner” as a major source of government funding.   
 
Income taxes were often first introduced as emergency war time measures (1798 in the U.K., 1861 
in the U.S.). In the U.S. a constitutional amendment (the Sixteenth, 1913) was required to provided 
a legal foundation.  Many economists, however, oppose the income tax (where income is not 
defined to exclude savings) and have instead proposed variants of CITS: including Thomas Hobbes 
(1651, 226), John Stuart Mill (1884), Irving Fisher (1906; 1937; 1939; Fisher and Fisher 1942), 
Luigi Einaudi (2006 [1928-9], chapters 14, 15 and 16), Friedman (1943), Nicholas Kaldor (1955) 
and Meade (1978).   
 
In the 1970s, fiscal dysfunction revived interest in CITS - which received largely favourable 
attention from the 1972 Swedish Government Commission on Taxation (Lodin 1978), the U.S. 
Treasury’s 1977 Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, the Institute of Fiscal Studies’ 1978 Structure 
and Reform of Direct Taxation (chaired by Meade)
vii plus a 1978 Brookings Institution conference 
(Pechman 1980).  The U.S. Treasury’s report began from the same starting point as earlier analyses: 
“There has been increasingly widespread dissatisfaction in the United States with the Federal tax 
system” (Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 1977, 1).
viii   
 
The “tax payer’s revolt” that fuelled the Thatcher-Reagan revolutions also led to a switch in the tax 
emphasis away from income towards consumption.  Rising inflation, in the absence of indexation, 
increased the tax burden through bracket creep and created further discontent.  In 1979, the 
Thatcher government lifted the VAT to 15% while making substantial cuts in marginal income tax 
rates (the highest marginal rate was 40% by 1988).   
 
In the U.S., in only four years of the two decades between 1944-63 was the top marginal federal 
income tax rate below 91%. The Reagan 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act was the largest income  
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tax cut in U.S. history: the top federal income tax bracket fell to to 50% (1982-86) and to 28% for 
1988.
ix   
 
Thus, we have inherited a hybrid income/CITS system.  VAT, the GST and sales taxes are CITS-
type arrangements – with regressive, or at least non-progressive, features, and numerous tax-
privileged savings accounts are now widely available.  Singapore has perhaps gone the furthest with 
the Central Provident Fund (CPF) whereby 34.5% of private sector wages (for workers aged below 
50) are channeled into compulsory savings accounts.
x     
 
Yet the conclusions drawn by an earlier generation retain their validity: these piecemeal 
components do “not reflect any consistent philosophy about the objectives of the system” 
(Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 1977, 1); instead we have “an unsystematic mixture of elements” 
(Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation 1978, 499).     
 
6. A Modern Moniac with Functional Intermediation 
Philips’ optimal control insights – and pedagogical representations – offer an engineering solution 
to contemporary malfunctions. Simons and Friedman were on one side of the post-1936 divide; 
Meade and Modigliani on the other; Pigou was the whipping boy for those who created the 
Keynesian divide; Phillips was the whipping boy for anti-Keynesians; Friedman was a “scourge” 
for Kaldor (1982).  However, by combining their insights with the Moniac, we can derive a method 
of eliminating the macroeconomic consequences of financial crises.    
6.1 The Consumed Income Tax Structure: Fisher, Kaldor and Meade  
Income can flow into Consumption (C), Savings (S) or Taxation (T).  Household savings can be 
divided into two flows: Pre-tax Individual Savings Accounts (PISA) and post-tax savings (S); PISA 
is then deducted from income (Y) to derive taxable income:  
1.  Y – PISA = C + S + T 
CITS rates can be progressive or flat. 
6.2 Private Sector Balance (Optimal Savings): Pigou and Modigliani  
Following Pigou (1924),
xi an optimal level of PISA (PISA*) can be targeted, with or without a 
compulsory component:    
2. PISA = PISA*  
Thus PISA flows into a separate box - not directly into Phillips’ M2 box.  
By implication, following Franco Modigliani, this is the equivalent of using marginal CITS rates to 
target the Life Cycle Optimum (LCO) of current consumption, thus reducing the problem of 
unfunded liabilities of future retirement income streams:  
3. C = C* = LCO  
6.3 Public Sector Balance: Friedman  
Following the fiscalist Friedman (1948), the level of government expenditure should be determined 
by community (electoral) preferences and only revised after another electoral cycle:  
4. G = G*      
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Fiscal rationality implies that the budget be balanced each year:    
5. T = G = G* 
Thus: 
6. Y = C* + I + G* + (X – IM) 
where X = exports and IM = imports.  
6.4 Rules Not Discretion: Simons  
The Phillipsian challenge is to find a mechanism by which PISA* can flow into Investment (I) 
without financial sector interruption thus dampening the swing of the business cycle.  Pension funds 
currently receive PISA-like funds or at least tax-privileged savings flows: one method would be to 
compel pension funds to use those funds for net investment purposes (not the purchase of second 
hand assets). 
Another method would be to auction PISA funds to intermediaries on a price competition basis. 
Thus the investment demand schedule would be attached to the PISA* box so that the “enterprise” 
rate of interest determines the price but not the quantity of the flow into Investment.  If savings did 
not passively flow into M2, intermediaries – stripped of much of their deposit base – would be 
obliged to participate in these price auctions for the privilege of lending to the private sector for 
investment purposes.   
Intermediaries must also be stripped of the “for what” discretion that they currently enjoy (while 
retaining the “to whom” discretion).  Funds won at auction must be used for specific pre-specified 
purposes (e.g. Gross Fixed Capital Formation). Thus, following Henry Simons (1936), 
intermediaries must be rules-constrained: hoarding must be prohibited and the flow of PISA into 
Investment must be made uninterruptible.  
7.  Implications for stabilization policy: inflation control 
The fiscal control of inflation  
 
Fiscal rationality implies both public balance, G* = T and private inter-temporal balance, PISA = 
PISA* and C = C* = LCO (the Life Cycle Optimum, leaving sufficient resources to finance future 
consumption).  
 
Targeting PISA* via compulsory savings has two advantages. First, one instrument (CITS rates) has 
one target (T = G*); second, the inflation-targeting operating characteristics are superior (requiring 
less macroeconomic discretion).  
 
Alternatively, marginal CITS rates could aim at both public and private balance. Whilst structural 
levels of G and T should be determined by elected representatives, an inflation-targeting body – 
such as a central bank, or a Fiscal Policy Council – could annually fine tune T to keep C close to C* 
(and thus dampen undue rises in the consumer price index).
xii      
 
With compulsory savings targeting PISA* there would only be random variations around C*. If 
PISA* is targeted through CITS rates, more deviations are possible. If there is a departure from the 
LCO component of fiscal rationality and resources shift from savings to current consumption (C > 
C*), two adverse consequences will follow: consumer prices will tend to rise, and savings will be 




If fiscal rationality is associated with the “enterprise” rate of interest and a relatively stable price 
level, and if sub-optimality (C > C*) is associated with undue inflation, the policy conclusion is 
clear: raising end-of-year CITS rates will tend to dampen sub-optimal C (by raising PISA), without 
adding to the price level.
xiii  
 
In Wicksellian analysis, the “natural” rate of interest is neutral with respect to price movements;
xiv 
any rise in consumer prices when C = C* = LCO could be regarded as the “natural rate of inflation” 
(not to be tackled by reducing the demand for consumer goods, but by addressing supply issues).   
 
The price level may also rise because of upward pressure on input costs. If policy makers respond 
by raising CITS rates, PISA will also increase, the “enterprise” rate of interest will fall and the 
volume of investment funding will increase. In so far as this will increase capital per worker and 
thus productivity this should, ceteris paribus, tend to exert downward pressure on production costs 
(a countervailing supply side response).  This nexus thus provides a market-based antidote to both 
demand-side and supply-side consumer price inflation.   
 
In a Wicksellian world, inflation is propagated by monetary authorities lowering the interest rate 
below the natural level (the appropriate policy response is to raise interest rates).  In the Moniac 
world with functional intermedaition, inflation is propagated by sub-optimal savings (PISA < 
PISA*): this raises the interest rate.  The appropriate policy response is to raise CITS rates (and thus 
PISA): this will tend to lower the interest rate. 
 
CITS targets consumer spending (and thus consumer prices) directly; this virtuous fiscal-induced 
anti-inflation spiral will tend to increase savings, wealth, productivity, employment and tax revenue.  
 
Monetary “discipline”  
 
In contrast, the vicious monetary-induced anti-inflation spiral operates through a long and damaging 
series of adverse shocks (the transmission mechanism) and tends to increase unemployment, 
bankruptcies, home foreclosures, budget deficits and the exchange rate. 
 
First, an anti-inflation increase in interest rates raises the future cost of funding government debt 
and thus increases future tax liabilities.   
 
Second, debt-financed firms will face increased borrowing costs.
xv If some of these firms operate on 
a mark-up pricing basis, this anti-inflation policy will, at least in the short-run, impart upward 
momentum to prices.   
 
Third, if average costs in the consumer sector rise above prices, this will tend to cause sectoral exit.  
This reduction in supply will tend to impart upward pressure on consumer prices.  
 
Fourth, the exit of debt-financed suppliers from the consumer goods sector will tend to reduce 
competitive pressures.  Entrenched equity-financed firms will acquire enhanced concentration ratios 
and market power.  
 
Fifth, the rise in interest rates will tend to reduce investment and thus future productive capacity.    
 
Sixth, the cost of debt-financed consumer items will rise; apprehensive consumers will also tend to 
save rather than spend.  If household savings are hoarded by apprehensive financial intermediaries, 
vault cash and bank reserves will increase and the money supply will fall. This may require further  
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corrective policy action.     
 
Seventh, the rise in interest rates will, ceteris paribus, tend to attract an inflow of hot international 
money, thus exerting upward pressure on the exchange rate and adverse pressure on the trade-able 
goods sector (which will tend to shed labor). 
 
Eighth, other interest-sensitive sectors (such as residential housing) will be adversely affected.    
 
Ninth, the general contraction in demand will reduce employment and income and increase 
unemployment. 
   
Tenth, tax revenues will fall and transfer payments will increase. The government deficit will 
become larger. 
 
Eleventh, the stock of human and physical capital will fall (at least temporarily).  
 
8.  Implications for debt elimination 
Fiscal “discipline” 
Under current arrangements, financial crises are often followed by deficit-financed fiscal 
expansions (usually induced by panic).  When the consequences of financial crises subside, the 
fiscal pendulum swings savagely in the other direction.  But politically destabilizing fiscal 
“discipline” (cutting government expenditure and increasing income tax) contract aggregate 
demand and may be self-defeating.  
 
First, reducing public sector employment will, at least in the short run, transform productive 
workers into the unemployed.  In so far as unemployment benefits are lower than public sector 
salaries, this will marginally reduce public expenditure.  
 
Second, the loss of public sector employees will reduce the quantity and quality of public services.  
There may be solid reasons for reducing the size of the public sector, but financial crises are 
unlikely to produce optimal results in this respect.  
 
Third, public sector infrastructure projects are likely to be postponed thus impairing the future 
productive capacity of the private sector (such projects should typically be brought forward in a 
recession, not postponed). 
 
Fourth, the addition of unemployed public sector workers to private sector labor markets will tend 
to lower the equilibrium real wage.   
 
Fifth, increasing income taxes will widen the divergence between the price paid by employers and 
the price received by workers and thus reduce labor demand. 
 
Sixth, the fall in income will tend to reduce tax revenue and the rise in unemployment benefits will 
tend to increase government expenditure, thus worsening the budget deficit.  
 
Seventh, bond dealers will tend to raise the cost of financing this deficit – adding still further to the 
debt problem. 
 




Ninth, human and physical capital will be destroyed; some human capital will be diverted into 
political campaigns to resist the fiscal “discipline.” 
 
Using the price mechanism to eliminate public debt            
In contrast, the Moniac system with functional intermediation, eliminates the adverse consequences 
of balanced budget legislation (or aspiration); eliminating debt also becomes relatively benign. 
Deficit-financed stimulus packages become redundant.   
 
The debt legacy can be eliminated by increasing marginal CITS rates: offering the alternative of 
increasing PISA deposits or paying more tax.
xvi  Either way, the price mechanism is being used to 
enable each individual to make an optimizing decision to consume or to postpone consumption.  
Both actions contribute to tax revenue: consumption (via CITS), savings (via the stimulus provided 
by increasing investment).  This system provides an unusual correspondence between private and 
social optimality in the pursuit of debt elimination.   
 
9. The Phillips Club?  
Pigou (1877-1959) and Phillips (1914-1975) shared a birthday (18 November) and almost a date of 
death (7 and 4 March respectively).  More significantly, there are similarities between the whipping 
boy role allocated to Phillips and the multiple whipping boy roles allocated to Pigou.  
Pigou was a whipping boy for four revolutions. First, the 1936 Keynesian revolution (which nudged 
him into business cycle obscurity); second, the Chicago counter-revolution (specifically, the Coase 
Theorem, which after 1958, tended to nudge him towards externality-redundancy); third, in the 
1970s, the Public Choice revolution (in which he is characterised as having a naive view of 
bureaucratic motivations); and fourth, the Austrian free market revolution (Hayek planned to write 
an essay for Encounter on ‘The Suppression of Information’ ‘outing’ Pigou as a long-time 
Bolshevik spy).   
Recently, Greg Mankiw established the Pigou Club to highlight the insights that Pigou’s work can 
yield with respect to numerous public policy issues (protecting environmental quality etc.). 
‘Members’ of the Pigou Club are invited to accept “higher Pigovian taxes such as gasoline taxes or 
carbon taxes.”
xvii Likewise, Phillips Club ‘members’ should be devoted to finding methods of 
stabilising the macroeconomy. This paper proposes one extension of the Moniac – there are surely 
other possibilities which may assist us in our project of stabilising the macroeconomy and 
minimising the macroeconomic externalities inflicted by financial engineers. 
 
Appendix 1 
Assessing the Effect of Taxes on the Economy: Deflate housing bubble with targeted taxes  
 
Robert Leeson August 19, 2005  
 
San Francisco Chronicle  
 
The unsustainable increase in the value of residential property can only be explained by the 
existence of a speculative bubble. In the last year, house prices increased nationally by 12.5 percent; 
the median Bay Area house, figures from real-estate information firm DataQuick show, is now 
more than $600,000 (a one-year increase of almost $100,000). A large proportion of this recent 
(2004) momentum was driven, according to the National Association of Realtors, by not-for-owner-




This pyramid scheme is a movable feast for those with a roof, but it conjures up the prospect of 
increasing intergenerational poverty for those "below stairs." Unless this issue is tackled, many 
Americans may never become first-time buyers -- undermining the legitimacy of the property-
owning democracy.  
 
Moreover, when the mania ends and the enormous financial bubble bursts, there will be a 
synchronized downturn in many affected countries. As other places have discovered (Japan and 
Hong Kong in the 1990s, the Netherlands in 2003), a quick de-escalating of housing prices can lead 
to financial and economic meltdowns.  
 
What can be done to reduce the probability that this type of mania will recur?  
There are no ideal instruments -- we are searching for the least-worst alternative. First, we could 
continue to rely on "perspective and good sense on the part of borrowers" as recommended in a 
speech last month to the American Enterprise Institute by Ben Bernanke, chairman of President 
Bush's Council of Economic Advisers (and a possible candidate for the next chairman of the 
Federal Reserve). Thus, monetary policy could continue to target price inflation, while informally 
leaning against bubbles (bubble talk counteracted by piercing Fed talk). But apart from jawboning, 
central banks have only one crude and blunt instrument -- interest rates -- to target or influence two 
objectives.  
 
Monetary chemotherapy fails to discriminate between asset purchases for residency and for resale 
(or speculation). Raising interest rates to take some steam out of property prices will also tend to 
take the wind from the sails of economic growth. Using monetary policy to influence a bubble 
involving a limited number of people will also harm a wider group by slowing growth, cutting tax 
revenues and thus worsening the federal budget deficit. Alternatively, fiscal policy could target 
bubbles, freeing central banks to focus on inflation.  
 
Fiscal policy can alter incentives. The emotional black hole that surrounds a bubble compresses all 
time horizons, encouraging investors to think short term and seek speculative profits rather than 
about long-term business development. Increasing taxes on short-term capital gains while reducing 
taxes on long-term capital gains would thus exert a gravitational pull in the right direction.  
 
Speculation always co-exists with genuine enterprise -- but public policy must ensure that the first 
does not dominate or declass the second. How can entrepreneurs be persuaded to direct their 
energies and their capital into socially useful channels rather than throwing scarce resources at 
bubbles?  
 
Entrepreneurs are attracted by the excess capital gains, which characterize all but the final stages of 
a bubble. Economists usually advocate taxation to tackle negative "externalities" (or spillover 
costs): If entrepreneurs were faced with a speculation tax on "flipping" (rapid buying and selling), 
this would alter their private calculation and might nip a bubble in the bud.  
 
Central banks impose marginal increments on interest rates when price pressures are perceived to be 
rising unduly. Marginal increases in capital- gains tax should also become an apolitical tool of such 
macroeconomic management.  
 
Californians can tackle this issue at a state level. The governor should appoint an asset-price 
monitoring committee to "out" sectors that display upward price movements inconsistent with 
market fundamentals by recommending a temporary excess capital-gains tax that is proportional to 




To ease asset-price inflation in a particular location, the committee could formulate a proposition: 
for example, a 20 percent excess capital-gains tax on all property sales in that area. (This could 
apply to property purchased after a certain date or on all property transactions regardless of the date 
of initial purchase). This would tend to discourage the flood of speculative funds into the targeted 
sector and would exert "outward" pressure on the bubble. Raising interest rates to achieve the same 
objective would hurt a wide section of people who had in no way benefited from the bubble. An 
excess capital-gains tax might also divert investment toward less "hot" regions.  
 
Taxation has two advantages over monetary policy. The first rests on equity grounds: It targets only 
those who had made excess capital gains from the bubble. The second rests on macroeconomic 
stability grounds. Tightening monetary policy from fear of the future instability associated with 
allowing a bubble to run its course tends to induce current macroeconomic instability. A 
quantifiable cost is thus imposed on the economy: lower growth, lost output and reduced tax 
revenue. As unemployment increases, so, too, will the number of interest-sensitive borrowers (those 
with repayments exceeding 20 percent of their gross income) leading to distress sales and 
bankruptcies. In contrast, fiscal policy provides a temporary capital-gains tax windfall -- which 
must be returned dollar-for-dollar as temporary tax cuts in the same year.  
 
Relevant overseas experiments should be monitored (such as the 5 percent capital-gains tax recently 
imposed on any Shanghai house resold within two years and the variable Beijing housing tax, 
determined by how long the property is held). Temporary excess capital-gains taxes on commercial 
and investment property are a superior alternative to either doing nothing or dragging monetary 
policy into bubbling buildings in the hope of boring a hole small enough to expel steam, but not 




Private banks need public rival to cut costs  
Robert Leeson | September 22, 2009    
The Australian  
AFTER the Great Depression, our central bank (then the Commonwealth Bank) competed 
vigorously for banking business. 
 
In 1945, the Commonwealth Savings Bank and the state savings banks held almost half of total 
deposits.  
 
Today , a national savings agency could offer a variety of competitive financial instruments 
including most, if not all, banking services at low cost and with neighbourhood access via 
Australia Post.  
 
Britain has had such an agency since 1861 (a public-private partnership that manages about 9 
per cent of the domestic savings market). At its peak, the US Postal Savings System was the 
country's largest single savings bank. This competition for funds would force banks to cut costs 
and improve services.  
 
Equally, the deposits attracted could (for the duration of the current crisis) cut debt-servicing 




Public banking offers eight identifiable benefits:  
 
* First, private banks are a magnet for scarce capital (skilled labour, shopfront real estate plus 
resources held as insurance against risk-weighted assets). Moreover, banks that fail in their core 
activity (risk assessment and management) are required by regulators to increase their capital-
asset ratio. In contrast, public banks that transform deposits into risk-free assets have no such 
requirements: thus capital can be released for more socially productive purposes.  
 
* Second, in addition to holding capital to cover their assets (loans), private banks hold a 
fraction of their deposits as reserves to cover their liabilities (deposits). This "fractional-reserve" 
private banking allows a series of loans to piggyback on each deposit (a fraction of 
each deposit is held in reserve, the remainder is lent out, to reappear elsewhere in the banking 
system as another deposit, part of which is held, the remainder lent out etc).  
 
When depositors panic, banks scramble to liquefy loans and lending becomes scarce.  
 
In contrast, fractional-reserve public banking incurs no deposit-guarantee expenses and 
eliminates the prospect of bank runs and loan-to-liquidity panic attacks.  
 
* Third, if the non-reserve part of these deposits were dedicated to financing the forthcoming 
federal deficits, the cost to the taxpayer of servicing the debt would fall (interest rates on 
deposits are typically less than rates on Treasury securities).  
 
* Fourth, any initial reduction in the money supply (as funds migrate from banks to higher-
interest national savings deposits) would need to be reversed by a compensatory increase in the 
money supply by the Reserve Bank. This process, facilitated by the RBA buying Treasury 
securities, would lower still further the cost of debt repayments. The coupon and maturity 
payments would accrue to the RBA, who return much of their revenue to the Treasury.  
 
* Fifth, reducing the federal debt would exert downward pressure on interest rates, making 
borrowing cheaper and assisting the process of capital formation.  
 
* Sixth, some federal debt would be held by overseas residents who receive coupon payments 
from the Treasury. In contrast, interest paid on national savings deposits would accrue locally, 
providing a stimulus to domestic aggregate demand and income 
that would otherwise be forgone.  
 
* Seventh, this competition for funds would advance the cause of financial literacy. The bond 
market has a default-free base (Treasury bonds) against which to evaluate risk (all the way to 
junk bond status). Having a run-free benchmark allows savers to evaluate risk (all the way 
to junk deposit status).  
 
* Eighth, globally the "too big to fail" doctrine has led to mergers and acquisitions -- some 
funded by bailout handouts.  
But reducing the size of the financial sector produces a sounder system at lower cost. In the 
short run, this would increase the loss of financial sector jobs -- but structural efficiency requires 
that lower-valued jobs be replaced by higher-value employment opportunities.  
 
Incentive-conflicted banks (which are currently hoarding rather than lending) may complain that 
the loss of deposits will hinder their ability to lend -- but they can still compete by accessing 




Perhaps "angels" and venture capitalists can best serve the business start-up market through 
their more clearly aligned interests. Moreover, technology (almost costless electronic banking 
etc) and the advance of peer-to-peer lending may already be transforming financial 
intermediation in ways currently difficult to envisage.  
 
When the current crisis subsides and budgets return to balance, the non-reserve part of these 
deposits could be auctioned by the Australian Office of Financial Management to financial 
intermediaries (banks etc) on a contractual basis (every dollar borrowed must be lent to a 
designated sector or returned).  
 
The spread between the cost of the funds (the interest paid on deposits) and the return (the 
interest rate paid by the auction-successful intermediaries) can fund tax cuts.  
 
The transitional costs of reconstruction are smallest when a system is broken. Improved 
regulation might shed light on the murky toxic paper that floats menacingly around the global 
financial system, but shrinking institutions that are too big and too toxic to fail reduces both 
their size and their toxicity.  
 
Having been financially engineered into crisis, we must now engineer our way out.  
 
Robert Leeson is a Visiting Fellow at Stanford University and Adjunct Professor of Economics 
at Notre Dame Australia University  
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,,26105894-16425,00  
.html 
Appendix 3 Back to the Drawing Board  
Australian Financial Review 17
th October 2008  
The emergence of money was as significant a step in human evolution as was the emergence of 
language, property rights and permanent settlements. Indeed, the hieroglyphics of elementary 
commercial accounting evolved into written language. But now it is clear that we have allowed 
sophisticated equations, derived from those early hieroglyphics and applied to financial instruments 
(supposedly backed by housing property), to freeze both money and capital markets.  
Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, described the “judicious operations of banking” in 
almost miraculous terms: “a sort of waggon-way through the air” - that is, an almost costless 
infrastructure underpinning our economic system. The opponents and critics of our system see this 
miraculous invention as an Achilles’ heel. Lenin reputedly declared that “the best way to destroy 
the Capitalist System was to debauch the currency … all permanent relations between debtors and 
creditors, which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be 
almost meaningless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lottery”.  
Lenin was supposedly referring to price inflation; but allowing un-resisted asset price booms to turn 
inevitably to bust has proved just as potent as a “Financial Weapon of Mass Destruction”. Neither 
President Khrushchev nor Osama Bin Laden was able to “bury” us; but the current Masters of the 
Universe have financially engineered us to the verge of a virtual ice age.  
Banking in Smith’s time could be injudicious: in 1771, the Ayr Bank fell victim to “schemes of 
chimerical projectors”. In 2008, moralistic posturing about “greed” and injudicious behaviour will 
not suffice (is the seller of 900 liar loans morally superior to the seller of 1000 liar loans?). Instead,  
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we must reconsider the incentive structure that unites the private optimality of financial players with 
social disaster.  
The United States has a long and inglorious history of financial crisis (1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 
1884, 1893, 1907, 1930-33, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1998 and now 2007-): serial bubbles followed by 
“Minsky moments” (named after Hyman Minsky, the radical Keynesian who analysed bubbles and 
their prickings). It is, therefore, not surprising that the latest Minsky moment was detected by at 
least some of those whose careers have been devoted to social, and not necessarily private, 
optimality.  
One perceptive Cassandra was Bill White, retiring Head of Monetary and Economic Department at 
the Bank for International Settlements (located in Basle, Switzerland). BIS, the most active 
international body in the pursuit of adequate regulatory supervision of trans-national banks, 
promoted the 1988 Basle Capital Accord and Basle11 (a twenty first century update). It is reputedly 
the oldest international financial organization, founded in May 1930, just prior to the meltdown that 
turned a Wall Street price collapse into the prelude to World War 11.  
White analysed the inherent procyclicality of liberalized financial systems: credit expansion fuelling 
growth and asset price inflation, resulting in hubris (undue optimism and receding perceptions of 
risk) followed by nemesis (financial collapse with dangerously unpredictable real-financial 
interactions). He detected three sources of irresponsible laxity: internal governance, external 
oversight and monetary policy.  
Central banks, White argued, misinterpreted the temporary contribution made to inflation targeting 
by low cost Chinese exports as a new paradigm (an essential delusionary ingredient of most 
bubbles). His fundamental solution: “a new macro financial stability framework to resist actively 
the inherent procyclicality of the financial system”.  
When Oedipus realized the extent of the curse inflicted by his actions, he ripped out his eyes; in 
contrast, many of the actors in this current tragedy have walked away with millions. To address this 
iniquity, White proposes that both dividends and bonuses should be cut in order to increase capital 
cushions.  
Others, such as Allan Meltzer, have suggested that bail-outs are little better than bail-ups: money 
injected into tipsy banks should come as loans, with interest rate strings attached. Certainly, we do 
the public relations cause of our system no good by appearing to subsidise those whose topic paper 
has jammed up our engines.  
The “Okun gap” measures the lost income associated with an economy operating below full 
employment. It would be also be possible to estimate the “Minsky gap”, the “externalities” (third 
party costs) caused by the dysfunctions that the financial services sector inflicts on the real 
economy (lower growth and income, taxpayer funds injected etc).  
As we struggle to find ways of unfreezing the system, it is possible to argue that every injected 
taxpayer dollar has a reverse multiplier withdrawal effect on the overall size of the Minsky gap, and 
therefore pays for itself (a macroeconomic bargain). But there is a strong ethical and public 
relations case for arguing that these taxpayer rescue funds should originate from the externality-
producing sector.  
Indeed, providing tax-based subsidies to toxic paper producers is the reverse of what economic 
theory suggests. Instead, a Financial Services Emergency Tax (FSET) could be imposed either on 
all non-modest financial sector incomes or on a “fencer’s fingerprint” basis (those who deal with 
toxic paper should be held responsible, either individually or institutionally).   
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Any long term anti-freeze remedy must address the incentive structure that so blatantly fails to align 
private with social objectives. The Masters of the Universe in the 1960s and early 1970s were the 
“stateless princes” who jetted about the world’s financial centres trying, unsuccessfully, to preserve 
a doomed mechanism: the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. They failed to adequately 
understand their own system and the forces they confronted (including Milton Friedman and his 
ally, U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz).  
Institutionally captured minds rarely escape the captivity of the system they serve. Friedman 
suggested that the Bretton Woods whiz kids should give up the ghost and (rather insultingly, 
perhaps) be released to perform useful and productive work. Yet since the 1970s, unit costs of 
financial products have fallen while the proportion of National Income consumed by the financial 
sector has almost doubled. But the net “value added” by the financial sector (minus the Minsky gap, 
that is) is likely to be negative after a major Minsky moment. Shultz’s solution to the current 
problem of financial institutions that are “too big to fail” is to let them shrink.  
But his successor at Treasury, Hank Paulson, is an inveterate Wall Street insider, and appears to be 
a mental captive of the system he serves. The chair of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, made his 
academic living by analysing the inactivity and ineffectiveness of central bankers during the Great 
Depression: he too shows little sign of having thought beyond the unfreezing period. This mental 
captivity allows banks that are too big to fail to enlarge themselves through mergers and 
acquisitions: a sub-prime policy response that will do nothing to address the serial bubble problem.  
How can Shultz’s suggestion be operationalised? How can we create a leaner financial system that 
consumes a smaller proportion of national income, is less prone to breakdown and generates smaller 
externalities? What competitive forces could unleash the winds of creative destruction in the 
financial services sector whilst putting its essential functions on firmer grounds?  
First, we need a progressive consumption tax that either replaces or supplements the income tax. 
Economists have long seen such a system as providing an incentive mechanism that boosts savings: 
the current emergency may weaken politically-driven anxiety about such schemes. Any incentives 
(such as negative gearing) that direct entrepreneurial endeavours towards bubble prone activities 
(such as property) should be swept away as part of the rubble of a discredited and broken system.  
Second, we need robust vehicles to channel and preserve these savings. In the long run, households 
as surplus agents require financial assets capable of transforming their savings into retirement 
income. In the shorter term, households as deficit agents need to access resources to finance human 
capital formation (education), residential purchases and lumpy expenditures (car loans etc). 
Businesses as deficit agents require financial capital to purchase physical capital (workplaces, 
equipment and inventories).  
At least some of these functions can be competed for by non-profit organisations. The Reserve 
Bank of Australia used to be part of an institution (the Commonwealth Bank) that combined 
commercial with central banking activities. The Federal Reserve System was set up as a bankers’ 
bank (although Fed employees are allowed to bank with the Fed). We should now consider allowing 
central banks to become depository institutions. Simple banking services (clearing checks, 
electronic transfers, cash withdrawals and deposits etc) can all be transacted through central banks 
accounts, with high street access through post offices. Governments can use average balances to 
reduce taxation (by, for example, funding deficits in a less expensive manner).  
Central banks such as the Fed allow consumers to buy Treasury securities directly. Clearly, this a 
complicated and controversial issue but we also must consider allowing central banks to offer a 
wider range of savings vehicles and find non-political ways of transforming these funds into 
productive capital.   
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With respect to business investment, we cannot trust politicians to pick winners – but there is no 
reason to believe that a non-partisan Fiscal Policy Council could not follow general parliamentary 
guidelines and fund, for example, infrastructure projects, in accordance with the needs of 
macroeconomic stability and guided by social cost benefit analysis.  
We also need a systematic financial literacy campaign (dealing with credit cards, mobile phones 
etc) to reduce the numbers who fall victim to the poverty exploitation industry. (It is also tempting 
to suggest that those who stand for public office should be obliged to sit examinations that test their 
ability to resist illiterate assertions about petrol tax holidays etc).  
Trial-and-error unfreezing should ultimately flush the toxic paper out of the system (although those 
who issue cave-backed jihad edicts must have noticed with “shock and awe” what a security-
threatening opportunity the mortgage-backed security activists have provided them with).  
Anti-freezing is far more challenging: this project must recognise that $60,000 a year regulators are 
pitted against $60,000 a week whiz kids whose function is to financially engineer their way around 
regulations. How tragic that such talent has been directed into such anti-social activities.  
With the demise of communism, capitalism appeared to become hegemonic and history appeared - 
to some - to have come to an end. But financial instability has driven capital into bear-like 
hibernation. Casino capitalism has been a disaster: a fundamental reconstruction of our financial 
architecture is required to put an end to the bubble-based merry-go-round.  
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NOTES 
 
i I am extremely grateful to Vela Velupillai, Stefano Zambelli and their colleagues at the University 
of Trento for organizing such a splendid conference to celebrate and reflect upon the 60
th 
anniversary of the Moniac.  I am also grateful to the conference participants for their insightful 
comments.   
 
ii All references to Phillips are to be found in Leeson 2000.   
 
iii Deacon’s accusations will be examined in a volume in the Palgrave Macmillan series Archival 
Insights into the Evolution of Economics.  
  
iv World War Two ended the Great Depression; the Vietnam War initiated the Great Inflation. The 
Vietnam War period and its aftermath was a low point for both fiscal and monetary policy outcomes 
(both of which became highly politicized and thus sub-optimal).  With respect to monetary policy, 
Fed Chair Arthur Burns was in danger of joining Richard Nixon’s “enemies list”.  According to the 
White House transcripts, Nixon, was concerned that Burns was not stoking up the economy 
sufficiently to assist his 1972 re-election chances.  Amid references to Burns’ religion (he is 
“talking to the Jewish press”), Nixon threatened that “war is going to be declared if he doesn't come 
round some” (cited by Abrams 2006). Burns responded to these pressures in conversations with 
Nixon captured on the White House tapes: “I am a dedicated man to serve the health and strength of 
our national economy and I have done everything in my power, as I see it, to help you as president, 
your reputation and standing in American life and history.  I’ve never seen a conflict between the 
two, but I want you to know this … the moment a conflict arises, I’m going to be right here.  I’ll tell 
you about it, and we’ll talk about it and try to decide where to go next” (March 1971).  The pressure 
continued, forcing Burns to protest: “No one has tried harder to help you” (June 1971).  In 
December 1971, Nixon continued to hector Burns about money supply growth: “get it up!” (cited 
by Meltzer 2009, 635, 793, 796). In January 1972, Nixon supplemented these conversations with a 
letter to the Fed Chair referring to Burns’ “absolute assurance that the money supply will move 
adequately to fuel an expanding economy in 1972 … What could happen out of all of this is that a 
major attack on the independence of the Fed will eventually develop” (cited by Meltzer 2009, 800).    
 
v It is tempting to describe this box as the Talibank Cholera Transmission Mechanism. 
 
vi Nomenclature reflected this intellectual revolution.  In the 1970s, the U.S. Tariff Commission 
(established 1916) became the International Trade Commission.  In 1974, the Australian Tariff 
Board became the Industries Assistance Commission; then the Industry Commission in the 1980s 
and then the Productivity Commission in April 1998. 
 
vii The IFS was established in 1969 to counter balance what was regarded as the prevailing ad hoc 
approach to tax policy.  Dick Taverne (Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1969-70) was appointed 
Director and two ex-Chancellors of the Exchequer served as Vice Presidents: Selwyn Lloyd (1960-
62) and Roy Jenkins (1967-70). The Meade Report took two years to prepare and was finished in 
June 1977.  J. R. M Willis (ex-Deputy Chair of the Inland Revenue) and Tony Atkinson served on 
the Committee; Mervyn King served as a research secretary. In addition to Kaldor, the committee 
was advised by Sven-Olof Lodin (who devised an expenditure tax for the Swedish Royal 
Commission on Taxation and who later became President of the Netherlands-based International 
Fiscal Association) and David Bradford, President Ford’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Tax Policy (1975-1976), who co-produced the US Treasury’s Blueprints for Basic Tax 
Reform (1977), which was considered influential on the tax policy of the Reagan administration.  
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viii In his 1976 Democratic Party acceptance speech, Jimmy Carter bluntly stated: “It is time for a 
complete overhaul of our tax system.  It is a disgrace to the human race” (cited by Federer 2004).     
 
ix But in the U.S. the policy pendulum swung to-and-fro with respect to consumption taxes.  First, 
tax-privileged Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) were established (shifting the tax emphasis 
towards consumption and away from income); but in 1986 significant new restrictions were placed 
on their use.  In 1993, more purpose-specific saving vehicles were offered (Medical Savings 
Accounts, the Roth IRA, an Education IRA and the Section 529 Qualified Tuition Program).   
 
x Attempts at reform have continued elsewhere: in the U.S., for example, in the 1990s, Senators 
Sam Nunn (R- New Mexico) and Pete Domenici (D- Georgia) proposed the Unlimited Savings 
Account (USA) Tax bill (Seidman 1997). 
 
xi See also Ramsey 1928. 
 
xii Having two targets and one instrument may require a lexicographic ordering of targets. 
Alternatively, if marginal CITS rates produced T = G* but PISA > PISA* a one-off end of year tax-
free consumption allocation could raise C towards C*.       
 
xiii In Keynesian multiplier analysis, savings are a leakage from the domestic multiplier process; 
with fiscal rationality, inflationary consumption is replaced by the injection of savings and capital 
formation.   
 
xiv “There is a certain rate of interest on loans which is neutral in respect to commodity prices, and 
tends neither to raise nor to lower them” (Wicksell 1936 [1898], 102).  
 
xv Larger and more established firms with access to equity financing often hold retained earnings as 
a buffer and can reduce dividend payments if necessary. 
 
xvi CITS is consistent with a tax-free threshold to minimize the need to compensate tax-paying 
consumers with transfer payments. 
 
xvii http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006/10/pigou‐club‐manifesto.html 
 